People regularly use “trust” in a way that causes me to say “I would refer to that as ‘faith’”, to which they often say “same thing”. In some languages, perhaps, yes. (Claude suggests Chinese, Hindi, Latin somewhat, Old English, and the Ancient Greek of the Bible).
In English, however, we have two words, and those words have come to cluster around different, though closely related, phenomena. In every day use, people sometimes still do use them interchangeably (although perhaps less often than they think). But if we’re going to make a technical field of the study of trust, then we will need to have precise terminology, the same as how in casual conversation “energy” or “power” or “force” might be interchanged in some contexts, but in a physics textbook these concepts are not only distinct but have very specific relationships to each other.
The word “objective” relates to the idea that reality will object if you attempt to perceive it other than it is, whereas “subjective” matters are subject to how you go about perceiving them. Reflexive things actually become different depending on how they’re perceived. Trust and faith relate to this, but they’re not quite the same. Trust is entirely a property of a subject (and their relationship to something) but is not something the subject can themself choose. Faith is choosable (and in some sense always chosen although often not knowingly) and governed by reflexivity.
There’s also the idea of bottom-up vs top-down processing in cognition and perception. Trust and faith relate to this as well, but… it’s still not literally that. Maybe slightly closer would be parts-to-whole vs whole-to-parts. In some sense, if any part of you distrusts, then on the whole you don’t trust. But you can still have faith, on the whole—in fact that’s sort of the main place faith happens.
There’s a famous is-ought gap: how do we bridge from our experience of observing that some things are, to the experience we have that things ought to be or become some way other than they presently are? Trust and faith are both about this, with trust more is-heavy and faith more ought-heavy. Perhaps trust is about how is affects ought, and faith is about how ought affects is. Something like that.
Hm so far we aren’t so precise, are we?
Maybe I’ll need to rename this essay:
One thing scientists do sometimes when attempting to formalize the boundaries of some categories, is to classify some specific examples of things that are or are not in a given category. Let’s do that: trust examples, faith examples, and examples where both are involved.
To be clear, I’m not just trying to document how people use the words; there are some underlying patterns I’m modeling, that these words certainly cluster around both in usage and in etymology.
Trust is like sex, and oxygen, and money: only salient when you don’t have enough of it.
As I type this, I am trusting more systems than I can count, in order to have my intention to write sentences effortlessly cause me to see my words appear on the screen. But let’s enumerate a dozen:
Naming all of these out is (1) exhausting and (2) a bit absurd.
Re (1) — the nature of trust is that you don’t notice it—you don’t have to. Your ability to function at all depends on constantly trusting countless things to operate the way they do. And sometimes one or two do mess up—most of the above examples, I have experienced breaking down at one time or another.
Re (2) — naming dozens of things you trust without the slightest concern is absurd because the act of naming them slightly diminishes the sense of trust in those things. By bringing into my awareness the fact that they could fail, I adopt somewhat less of the unquestioning attitude that characterizes trust.
Sometimes, I trust what other people say. Somebody says “the keys are hung up on the hook”, and my sense of reality now contains a sense that I will find the keys there (and not elsewhere), not just as a proposition but just as surely as if I’d observed it myself and stored it in my own object permanence. Sometimes I don’t trust what other people say—maybe I have contrary information, or maybe the speaker is unreliable in a liar-y or bullshitty kind of way, or maybe something else. The point is, my basic sense of the world doesn’t change as a result of what they say. I call this “not trusting what they say” (lol I mean so do most people, but I mean it in a more precise technical sense).
If I don’t trust what someone else says, I may be able to act as if I do, eg not searching somewhere else for the key, but it would be hard (and a bit absurd) for me to force myself to inject an object in my sense of reality that has not appeared there.
Sometimes I trust someone else to do something, because they agreed to do it and I trust their word, or because I’ve seen them do it many times before in similar situations. Once again, this sense of trust is part of my basic sense of reality: my anticipation, not merely an abstract disembodied prediction.
Like objectivity, I don’t choose to trust. I don’t control my own trust, directly. I observe that I do trust, or that I don’t trust. I may inquire or investigate further, and get more information, that causes me to trust more, or less.
“Trust is what truth feels like in first person,” I have remarked.
But trust is not just what “what is” feels like in first person. It has this ought element, where if I expect someone to cause a problem for me, then I don’t trust them, or the situation. To be trusted by me, something must not merely be predictable, but it needs to not oppose me; oddly, the latter is more important! I may trust someone who is very surprising, as long as those surprises are generally favorable or neutral. Meanwhile, someone who is predictably going to attack me is not someone I would say I trust, even if their attacks are predictable enough to defend against. (I might say “I trust I can handle them”)
Weirdly, people often tell me that they use the word “trust” this way (eg “I trust a rickety bridge to fall down”) but I never hear anyone actually say such things.
In some sense, trust and distrust are surprisingly close to what Heidegger referred to as “ready at hand” and “present to hand”, but extended beyond tools to people, systems, situations, and even perceptions. So it’s not quite about whether my will can simply flow out through something, but whether the something will dance smoothly with my will or whether it needs to somehow be managed, defended against, outwitted in order to avoid it causing a problem.
The most basic example of an act of faith is the act of shifting your view of a bistable illusion from one view to another (flipping the necker cube, changing the spin of the ballerina, etc). I got this from Scott Alexander’s summary of Steven Byrnes’ writing on Trance, which was one of the big things that clicked this into place for me.

Earlier today, I hit a new PR doing deadlifts: 5 × 320lbs (with a trap bar). I did my initial 2, and then paused. The process of psyching myself up to do more was complex. I’d been listening to music, and I ended up pausing it because it was too distracting (though sometimes it helps). I voiced aloud, “I’m here to do one thing, which is to stand up [while holding 320lbs]”. I visualized that simply happening. I psyched myself out once. I tried and failed once. I set those aside, deliberately rationalizing them as “I didn’t really commit.” I recommitted. Then I stood up, and stood up again, and stood up again. This was an act of faith.
Other examples of events that centrally involve movements in someone’s faith:
Faith is made of motivated reasoning, though perhaps more embodiedly than “reasoning” sometimes implies. It’s about choosing between ways to view the world not because one is clearly more true than another, but because one is better than another.
Many people, including most rationalists, tend to view this sort of thing as bad—as a cop-out from being willing to face actual truths. And it can be. However, as far as I can tell, these kinds of moves are inherent to how any kind of embodied cognition must necessarily works, and therefore it’s impossible to avoid making acts of faith, and therefore if you try not to do so then the effect is just that you become unable to notice the ways in which you do so. Ironically, adopting such a stance is itself a faith move.
For some people, you may get a clue that this is true for you by doing the following: try to imagine that what I’m saying has something to it, and that not only are you regularly deliberately choosing viewpoints based not on objective truth, but that this is actually good and necessary and that you might have more success and even more ability to know things well if you allowed yourself to do so more deliberately at times.
If you lean in the direction of adopting such a view, do you notice any objections coming up that have things to do with what other people close to you would think of you if you adopted such a view? That sort of thing certainly happened to me back when I was a rationalist. I considered developing an appreciation for emergence, then was hit with a concerning sense that I’d become one of the idiots that Eliezer has contempt for through the Sequences.
Speaking of which, contempt generally operates in faith-space: it’s an attempt to define which thoughts or people are not safe to engage with with curiosity, because they might possibly undermine some stability of a viewpoint that is held dear.
In addition to the sense in which any matter of multistable perception can be seen as a matter of faith, there’s additionally some sense in which someone can “have faith” vs “not have faith”, in a sort of general way, independent of target. I’ve sometimes described the most important religious question as nothing like an abstract “do you believe in God?” but instead simply “when you look around, you know, at everything, and ask: do we got this? …do you get back a yes or a no or a silence?” Someone raised in a happy family, with general ease in their life, might answer yes, while a supposedly religious person who is nonetheless tortured might answer no.
Remember the deadlift example above: Did I know I could do it? Did I trust I could do it? I didn’t know that if I kept the doubt out, I would succeed. But I certainly knew that if I allowed doubt in, the doubt would win. So I cultivated faith: I envisaged the worlds where it worked, and put out of mind the worlds where it didn’t.
Note that if I’d tried to deadlift 500lbs, my distrust would have been too great—both that I’d fail and that I might injure myself trying—for me to have cultivated enough faith. The ability to cultivate faith in things that predictably don’t end up working is dysfunctional, often classified as mania. But of course mania is right next to the type of cognition needed to have a successful startup.
When someone says “trust me”, sometimes this produces a clean bottom-up trust shift, because the context and the way that the person has by that very speech act staked some of their integrity on what they just said. But other times it doesn’t, in which case what’s in question is whether the person will choose to ignore or discount the facets of reality that generate the distrust: an act of faith.
Moreover, sometimes the speaker on some level knows there’s no good reason for the other person to trust them, even once asked to, in which case there’s also some motivated cognition going on on their part, where they’re forcefully adopting a view that ignores their own shortcomings and sees only their strengths.
Sometimes people will point out that if you deliberately adopt a stance of trust towards life, it will behave in a much more trustworthy way. This needs a dozen caveats, because in general what exactly are you trusting it to do?
In this way one’s trust can be a self-fulfilling prophecy, which makes it kind of choosable. However, my experience is that naive attempts to achieve this tend to involve repression of aspects of one’s knowing, which results in two issues: your cognition is impaired, and the state doesn’t last so you end up with oscillations between two semi-stable configurations.
If you entrust someone to watch or handle something, they may rise to the expectations you set, even if they wouldn’t have otherwise managed to do it. This is a place where people often use the word faith as well: “I have faith in you.” It also obviously has the reflexive nature I attributed above, to faith.
I will note that here there are limits to the degree to which one actually can trust the self-fulfilling prophecy in a given case, and one is often foolish to go beyond this. Some people you trust to be on time, regardless. Some you don’t usually trust to be on time, but if you say to them “it’s important that we be on time—I trust that you’ll do that” then you trust that they will take that seriously and make it happen. And other people… ha, fat chance. And no amount of trusting a human to fly by flapping their arms will make it happen—nothing personal.
Sometimes people will claim that there’s something inherently trustable—that by definition, whatever this thing is, is something you can trust. All of you, ∀ you, not just the good parts of you or whatever. This is sometimes called “God”, or “Source”, or even simply “Life”. Maybe there is such a phenomenon!
However, if there were some cosmic force that was inherently trustable, there’d still be a process of locating it in your own experience, and identifying to your own satisfaction that it is such a thing.
Thus, in this sense, one may take on faith that such a thing exists, but the actual experience of trusting it will in some sense come from the experience of finding such a phenomenon in your experience and observing that you do trust it absolutely, and that from what you can make of it, everything could trust it if they could likewise locate it.
To say “I trust”, one must suppose a self doing the trusting.
I once heard someone say “while I may be monogamous, sometimes my body wants to have sex with someone else, but I don’t because I’m committed to my partner”. Implied here is some way in which her body is not actually part of the commitment, which is odd for a commitment that’s so carnal.
People do all sorts of gerrymandering with what counts as them. Overtly, this shows up as “It wasn’t me, it was my addiction! My akrasia! My laziness!” Even “my brain”. Such a frame shift can be a helpful temporary move for taking part of you as object so you can understand it better, but as a generic explanation for something it’s an excuse; as a claim about what’s “really so”, it’s absurd.
One way that someone can succeed at “choosing to trust” someone or something—succeed at deliberately making “I trust you” true, when it wasn’t before, without collecting any new information—is to disown any part of them that doesn’t trust the other. This is an act of faith; an act of shifting one’s perceptual frame, flipping the necker cube. There are lots of things that you could reasonably call you; it may not be hard to find one that can honestly say “I trust” and give it the microphone.
But like, if you could watch this process happening with your inner coalitions as if it were a group of people with a literal podium, it would feel a bit absurd to go “ah yes indeed, I guess this person does trust!”.
The same is true of the trustee, not just the truster; I can gerrymander who “you” are in order to make “I trust you” true even when most others would agree that there are parts of you I’ve conveniently left out of my definition of you.
As I’ve often described, the problem with making a faith move then saying “I trust” is that there continue to be parts of you that don’t trust, which you’re just calling “not me”. Those parts may stay more or less repressed for your whole life, or you may struggle with them while continuing to disown them, or you may oscillate altogether out of your supposedly-chosen faith when some inner-coalitional coup occurs due to some new circumstances.
This is a more serious version of a problem that happens all the time, when something someone’s explaining to you makes sense while they’re there, but doesn’t when they go away. You made it make sense by setting aside your objections or confusions, rather than by resolving them, so in the absence of the external force of their presence, you can’t hold onto it.
I might distrust a person to do something today, while having faith that they’ll do it eventually. I might distrust many individuals, while having faith in humanity that goodness overall will prevail.
Faith seems to extend trust not just into the unknown but into deeper time and wider systems.
We don’t quite have it but it feels good to name all of these examples.
In future pieces of writing, I will explore some of these examples in more detail and try to articulate the fundamental pattern here. I suspect in order to properly formalize this I will need to learn more of the math of the free energy principle and active inference. I’m certain there’s a there there.
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